Abstract: This article addresses three goals that pertain to globalization and its impact on public policy in general and Hispanic higher education in particular. First, the author defines globalization as it relates to education. Then, he considers what globalization suggests with regard to the public good. Finally, four implications are suggested about how globalization frames Hispanic higher education. The purpose of this article is to suggest that the structural and cultural actions that we provide in response to a call for help is circumscribed by the pervasive nature of globalization.
alization (Tierney, 2003) , his intent is to address exclusively the circumstances in the United States. He does not suggest that globalization is an entirely new system of domination. The shortcomings of modernism are well inscribed in previous analyses (Best & Kellner, 1991 ; even though certain responses within the globalized state are akin to what might have been suggested under modernism, the rationales for doing so are quite different. Finally, the purpose here is not to suggest a one-to-one causality between globalization and the economic and philosophical poverty that currently pervades how we think about education. Instead, the author is trying to outline the lineaments of globalization with the intent that once we understand how globalization works, we might actually be able to create a reinvigorated public sphere that improves Hispanic higher education rather than simply responds to forces seemingly out of human control.
Defining Globalization
In the epigraph to The Grapes of Wrath (Steinbeck, 1939 (Steinbeck, /1992 , the "tenant men" and the "owners" are commiserating about the forces that are driving them, literally, off the land during the Dust Bowl. No one understands these forces and no one is to blame. Unlike a foe that a tenant might be able to fight, "the banks" appear as faceless entities that are made by men but not controlled by them. The inevitable power of capital drives the heroes of The Grapes of Wrath, the Joads, into failure and tragedy. The United States has been divided between the "haves" and "have-nots," and no one has an answer for how to understand, much less react, to the inequalities that exist.
The author has cited Steinbeck's epic because it is possible to make a similar statement now about the economic changes taking place-except the stage has become larger. Like the Joads, who were lost in a country where they could not understand the forces that were driving inequality, we are all now living in a world where it is difficult to understand the events that are transpiring. A vulgar form of Marxism once critiqued capitalism by way of evil capitalists who controlled the levers of power, but the time has long since moved away from the idea that one or another individual manages capital. Indeed, one of the vexing issues of globalization is its intriguing, yet confusing, nature.
The language in use about globalization harkens back to earlier eras. We are "global citizens" in a "global community" who live in a "global village." Terms such as citizen, community, and village all have a positive ring to them, so the assertion is that citizenship or communal identity has simply been transferred from one place to another. Of course, the movement from a locale where everyone knows everyone to an environment where the citizen does not know his or her neighbors ineluctably changes one's relationships with individuals and the environment. But how does this change occur?
Some have argued that the idea of globalization has been overblown. If globalization suggests trade and the impact of transnational capital, then one might argue that globalization has thrived since the Industrial Era. Hirst and Thompson (1999) noted the following:
The history of the internationalization of business enterprises is a long one. . . . Trading activities, for instance, date from the earliest civilizations, but it was the Middle Ages in Europe that marked the initiation of systematic crossborder trading operations carried out by institutions of a private corporate nature. (p. 19) Obviously, capitalism has always been international, and throughout the 20th century, companies existed with offices in multiple countries. As David Harvey (1989) has pointed out, those who think that globalization is just capitalism on a global scale believe that "there is nothing new in the capitalist search for increased flexibility or locational advantage" (p. 191) . From this perspective, globalization is little more than an elaborated vision of how capitalists would like the world to be rather than a system that is substantially different-a rupture, if you will-from the past. The effort to "capture" the Hispanic market is driven by the simple reason that the "market" is the fastest growing ethnic minority group in the nation. What one sees is a continuity that has been accelerated and aided by technology. Is globalization, then, "simply modernization on steroids," as Suárez-Orozco (2001) cogently asked? (p. 345).
Globalization has multiple, pedestrian interpretations attached to it. We hear that we live in a global world because we are able to get daily weather reports from Central America, McDonald's exists in cities throughout Latin America, and 80% of the United States has Internet capability. Movie studios speak of "going global" in their outreach, and university administrators try to develop online institutions and to set up branch campuses throughout Latin America to capture the "global market." From this perspective, globalization means everything, and, of consequence, it means nothing.
An alternative dilemma is the assumption that globalization is a synonym for internationalization. As Scholte (2000) usefully explained, "Whereas international relations are interterritorial relations, global relations are supraterritorial relations. International relations are cross-border exchanges over distance, while global relations are trans-border exchanges without distance" (p. 49). Scholte and others (Currie, in press; Currie, DeAngelis, de Boer, Huisman, & Lacotte, 2002; Sklair, 2001 ) made a useful distinction by forcing us to think about the frames of reference. Internationalization used the nation-state as the unit of analysis, whereas globalization is borderless. Interestingly, a definition then arises in reference to what existed rather than what exists. That is, previous conceptualizations employed nation-states to study a particular topic; proponents of glob-alization, however, are struggling to develop a definition by stating what the unit of analysis is not (Castells, 1997) . Again, one returns to Steinbeck's dilemma that a monster exists, created by men and women, but out of human control.
Globalization, like postmodernity, is both a social fact and a social construct. One does not choose to live in a global world any more than one chooses whether the United States has a capitalist system. One might try to alter the more brutal aspects of globalization (or capitalism), but to do so, one first needs to accept the existence of the system. After trying to understand the underlying logic of the system, it then might be possible to change it. At the same time, the challenge is to come to terms with how society has constructed that system. The system did not exist irrespective of human construction and interaction. The horror of Steinbeck's world may have seemed as if it were created by a monster, but humans had a role in constructing itso they also had a role in transforming it. Indeed, unionists, activists, and legislators were able to change the worst aspects of the 1930s; child labor laws, minimum wage laws, and workplace protection legislation came into being largely in response to injustices that existed.
The point here is that globalization is not simply a neutral fact. As Dudley (1998) has pointed out, "Globalization is an economic doctrine claiming to be neutral, natural, objective reality. Its claims to objectivity and truth constitute its power" (p. 29). In other words, globalization is what Foucault called a "regime of truth," a form of existing rationality that is more powerful than any other form. Thus, a social construction morphs into a social fact.
Globalization is also not simply an economic construction that determines human interaction. Some have assumed that the cultural aspects of globalization are equivalent to Americanization. That is, globalization is a synonym for all things from the United States. To be sure, in a world where CNN can be seen everywhere and Michael Jordan T-shirts are as likely to be seen on the streets of Chiapas as Chicago (or Washington), a case can be made for the ubiquitous presence of U.S. culture. More broadly, one might think of globalization as Western cultural imperialism. However, as the author elaborates later, globalization is more complex than a basic assertion of a homogenous culture, so much so that proponents in California mandate, for example, a "national language." The rise of transcoding, for example, will enable an English-speaking writer to send a message in English to a Spanish-speaking colleague, and the message will arrive in Spanish; such a technological capability suggests not that surface practices of homogenization will be pervasive but how societies define and construct social practices will take place at a much more complex level. As Waters (1995) noted, globalization "does not imply that every corner of the planet must become Westernized and capitalist but rather that every set of social arrangements must establish its position in relation to the capitalist West" (p. 6). A university serving only Hispanic students, then, runs the risk of homogenization, even if its surface-level practices are culturally appropriate.
Consider, for example, the ever-present McDonald's. McDonald's certainly has mandates for its franchises worldwide-"at McDonald's we have a saying, 'one taste worldwide'" (Schlosser, 2001 , p. 279)-but franchises also are encouraged to introduce local variations that are consistent with the global image. A consumer can buy tacos and burritos, for example, at McDonald's in Mexico City. Control is not enforced through the mirror imaging of every cultural artifact of a McDonald's but through the ability to remove economic support from the franchise. "Always to see opposition between the local and the global," warned Sklair (2001) , "is the result of a rather naive static view of traditional practices and cultures. Global forces certainly change local cultures, but this does not necessarily mean that they destroy them, though sometimes they do" (p. 256). Domino's Pizza, for example, has made a concerted effort to go global to the extent that pizza in India has a tandoori chicken topping. Domino's has been known for its delivery service, but their CEO states that on a global stage, each franchise asks "what are the best tactics that will work for them in their market, so they're not always looking to Ann Arbor" (Siegel, 2002, p. 35) . KFC and Burger King, then, adapt a global image such that what they offer in Buenos Aires differs from offerings in New York or even Madrid. Thus, the real impact of globalization is that it forces a local culture into a relational mode where it must react; no one is autonomous.
The author thinks of globalization in the following way: Globalization is a social process where the nation-state as the unit of economic, political, and cultural analysis becomes less important, or even irrelevant, and in its place are borderless worldwide social relations. As Bauman (1998) has noted, globalization involves a kind of "postgeography." As it will be discussed below, such a definition has at least three important implications for thinking about public education. First, new market forces bypass nationstate boundaries. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are examples of how trade agreements loosen borders rather than tighten them. Goods and services are internationalized, so an automobile, for example, will have part of its structure built in Latin America, its engine made in Mexico, and its chassis in Central America; but its corporate headquarters remain in Detroit. The result is that goods are made for lower wages because the nation where the headquarters exists is not responsible for minimum wage laws, environmental controls, and the like.
Second, globalization presumably could not have come about without the revolution in technology and communication. Automobiles can be made efficiently because of instantaneous communicative connections across the globe. Technology frees information and data from being tied to geography or time. Whereas ships used to convey information in a matter of months and airplanes in a matter of days, individuals now have immediate access to information. And third, globalization presses cultures against one another in ways that could not have been envisioned only a generation ago. One not only finds Michael Jordan T-shirts in Santiago; one also finds Peruvian flute music in downtown shopping malls, as U.S. consumers constantly respond to their preferences for the new and unique. Deterritorialization becomes an effect and a stimulus of globalization.
There are always reactions against such strong forces of change. After September 11, for example, there has been a movement in the United States that seeks to reinscribe notions of nationhood; a thin veneer of racism underlies many of the United States's antiterrorist policies that suggest "foreigners" are the cause of the United States's bout with terror. The "border" has taken on even greater rhetorical importance as some critics try to make the United States into a fortress walled off from its neighbors. The collapse of Enron underscores the problems that arise when companies have a global reach so that no one is able to regulate their rapacious economic appetite. The protestors at the World Trade Organization's (WTO) meetings are, in large part, trying to highlight how transnational policies of the WTO and agreements such as NAFTA harm those who are the least powerful. Yet such confrontations appear as Davids against the global Goliath. The inexorable force of globalization seems to move forward, undeterred by irritants that have neither the power nor the wealth to stop changes that are borderless.
The nature of the author's argument has four assumptions.
• The impetus for globalization derives from economic and technological forces that are hard to comprehend and control because they are transnational.
• The cultural logic of globalization maintains that happiness and meaning are found in goods and services. Consumerism is a necessary belief for globalization to function. • A result of the first two assumptions is a widening gap between the wealthy and poor, such that the wealthy are able to grab hold of economic and technological means to buy happiness and meaning, and the poor are left even further behind.
• What had been defined as "the public good" by the liberal state in the 20th century has gone through a sea change in definition. What one comes to expect of the state shrinks, or evaporates, as the individual is left to sink or swim in a borderless economy. One possibility is that Hispanic-serving institutions will be placed in even more difficult fiscal and political circumstances.
This last assumption has vast implications for how one defines concepts such as citizenry, social justice, and equity. In turn, expectations about public education in general and Hispanic higher education in particular also get redefined within the changing nature of the public good, and to this, the author now turns.
Redefining the Public Good
"Global corporate operations," wrote Miyoshi (1998) , "now subordinate state functions, and in the name of competition, productivity, and freedom, public space is being markedly reduced" (p. 263). What he means by "public space" is not merely geographic, although that too has been reduced. Rather, what one once assumed were the prerogatives of the state have been either given over to private enterprise or eliminated. Private companies, for example, increasingly manage prisons. For-profit education is the fastest growing sector of postsecondary education. The assumption that one should provide welfare for those who are most in need has been redefined. Health care is seen as having little to do with the state. Those who call for a greater communal role for the citizenry are derided as wanting a "nanny state," as if health, education, and welfare are maternal niceties rather than basic human rights. Institutions that serve a specific sector of students, such as Hispanics or Native Americans, are seen as irrelevant in an economy where a concept of the public good has been privatized. If a group wants an education, the thinking goes, then they should pay for it; the public has no role.
Simply stated, the role of the state is increasingly seen as not having much to do with issues such as equity in a globalized world. It is neither possible nor desirous, some will argue, for a state to be concerned about issues such as equity in an environment that is borderless. On one hand, a state is able to create policies for the people within its borders; when there are no borders, state policies become superfluous. On the other hand, in a global environment, the focus is not on public goods aimed at social justice such as public schooling. Instead, when transnational corporate economies are the engines that drive action, the state purposes and goals become focused on ensuring that corporations are competitive. The principles of the corporate economy take precedence. The profitability of businesses, rather than the creation of jobs and the extension of democracy to all citizens, becomes the goal of the state.
The late Pierre Bourdieu (1998) wrote that globalization "is the main weapon in the battles against the gains of the welfare state. European workers, we are told, must compete with the least favoured workers of the rest of the world" (p. 34). When a country compares its workforce to the world solely in economic terms, then obviously there is no bottom; or rather, there is a race to the bottom in which workers compete for jobs by taking the lowest minimum wage possible. Although the working class is the class that is hardest hit economically, the ramifications of globalization extend to all but the richest class. One ought not to be surprised, for example, that a consequence of globalization is that people in the United States work more and work longer hours. Only a generation ago, futurists predicted a 4-day workweek and increased leisure time. The opposite has occurred (Schor, 1992) . Chronic fatigue syndrome is as likely to strike someone in the upper-middle class as in the lower class; everyone works longer hours to meet the raised consumer expectations in a globalized economy. One result of globalization, then, is a contraction of the public as the Keynesian welfare state has defined it. As Rizvi and Lingard (2000) noted, "A radically different set of assumptions about the role of government and the rights of citizens [now exists]" (p. 42). One pertinent example pertains to how the citizenry define the public good. The idea of the public good has long been a contested term, but in general, it has referred to services that are provided by the state. Broadly speaking, the services are competitive neither with one another nor with the market. That is, a public good such as national defense assumes that there is one army, not many; one does not compete to win a contract to defend the United States. And without the state's providing the services for national defense, there would be no army. In a cogent discussion of previous definitions of the public good, Brian Pusser (2002) wrote, "Public goods are presumed to be under-produced in markets, as those two fundamental characteristics prevent individual producers from generating sufficient profit" (p. 3). One corollary to his comment is that some goods, such as education, might be profitable for some producers, but the manner in which the producer defines the good will exclude one or another constituency. A provider, for example, might be able to privatize education in a way that enables a profit to occur and competition to exist, but frequently, such a framework excludes those individuals that need additional services, such as special education.
The liberal modernist state has defined the public good such that it reflects twin beliefs about the citizenry. On one hand, the assumption has been that individuals have a collective responsibility to one another via state policies and agencies. Irrespective of whether the individual will benefit from a policy that derives from the public good, the argument has been made that a democratic state exists in part through bonds of social fellowship and obligation. In this light, Hispanic-serving institutions receive support from the public because when one group benefits, everyone benefits.
On the other hand, the assumption is that some public goods are provided to individuals so that when they receive the public goods, the state will benefit. Head Start, for example, was a program that combined both beliefs. Proponents argued that the liberal welfare state had an obligation to help those who could little afford to pay for educational services for the very young. Others opined that the children who participated in Head Start would ultimately be more productive citizens and require fewer public services.
Education has long been considered a public good. True, parents may have sent their children to a Catholic school, but the assumption was always that individuals had the right to educate their children in a manner that they saw fit, but the public had no obligation to pay for it. The public's obligation was to provide an elementary-secondary system irrespective of class, race, or locale.
Postsecondary education has not been seen exclusively as a public good, but a variety of public policies also has advanced the idea. The Morrill Land Grant Act, the GI Bill, and Title III are examples of fiscal decisions that advanced the notion of a public good in higher education. The initial definition of a meritocracy played into the idea of a public good that did not discriminate based on class or religion. The rapid expansion of higher education's research capabilities after World War II is an additional public investment. Even though the United States has had a vibrant private sector in higher education, close to 80% of postsecondary students benefit from public education. Even in private institutions, students have made use of federal and state funds to finance their education.
Globalization stands in opposition to concepts such as the public good. The worth of social and communal goals is less important than the ability to be competitive and to capture one or another market. Thus, the privatization of the public good seems to be the goal. Those who are optimistic about globalization try to reduce governmental regulation and roles to a minimum. As Jan Currie (in press) writes, "Privatization includes the corporatization of public sector organizations, selling off parts of public services and developing a user-pays philosophy" (p. 15). The public sector becomes more like a business; benchmarks, performance formulas, and outsourcing services become the objectives of the state.
The rise of such corporate reforms and the idea of managerialism capture the essential tension of globalization's discourse. As with previous technocratic calls, such as to improve efficiency and effectiveness, one is hard-pressed to argue against suggestions for benchmarking or a closer adherence to goal performance. The point, of course, is not to argue against an organization adopting one or another surface mechanism to perform its basic functions in a better manner. Rather, one asks how the underlying definitions of societal and organizational purpose are redefined. One needs to be constantly reminded that globalization is not a social fact but a construct that warrants investigation and elaboration.
The inevitability of the discourse is reminiscent of Steinbeck's epigraph. The world is changing, and if individuals do not change with the world, then those individuals will lose. Change suggests the need to become more competitive, which, in turn, implies that governments are inefficient. The taxpayer can do best without governmental restraints, and society is no worse off without the array of public goods that have been built throughout the 20th century. Obviously, the implications for education are significant. Reduced tax revenues mean there is less funding for public goods such as schools and colleges as well as college tuition. The reliance that Hispanic students and Hispanic-serving institutions have had on public monies is likely to all but evaporate. But, as important, a redefinition of the public good also reconfigures societal goals and objectives for public education; this is the subject of the following section.
Rethinking Public Education in a World Without Public Goods
Paradoxically, education remains a key factor in a globalized economy, but its purpose, framework, and provider change. Castells (2000) , for example, has pointed out that "advanced academic research and a good educational system are necessary but not sufficient conditions for countries, firms, and individuals to enter the information paradigm" (p.126). Although globalization shapes educational practices, the manner in which education is being configured ensures that education's purpose will not shape the globalization debate. Or rather, education will shape globalization's practices in a manner in keeping with those groups who stand most to benefit from globalization. Whereas the state once had the role of protecting those who were not powerful and enabling them to gain access to voice, in a globalized system, the power of the state evaporates. Of consequence, institutions such as Hispanic-serving public institutions are cast adrift and left to fend for themselves. Hispanic students in such a world find even the little supports that had been present to be eliminated.
Thus, education's role is one that stabilizes inequality and reduces the chances for participation in the democratic sphere on the part of those who are the least powerful. As Rivzi and Lingard (2000) have noted,
The global economy has created greater social stratification and more inequality in society. There is an emergent binary divide between those who are able to enjoy the new cultural goods and services exchanged in the global market and who are the victims of the global economy. (p. 420) The manner in which these changes have come about begin with the redefinition of education.
Education's Purpose in a Globalized World
As mentioned above, one might rightfully conclude that education's purpose in the United States throughout the 20th century was twofold. On one hand, it was an engine to help the poor out of poverty, and on the other, it was seen as a way to socialize individuals to various aspects of citizenship. Although these purposes were never fully realized, there is certainly enough evidence to support the notion that educational policies were geared toward advancing a public good. Hispanic-serving institutions, historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and Native American tribal colleges played a particularly important role. At a time when different groups were unable to find equal access at some institutions, these institutions tried to fill the gap. The assumption, never fully realized, was that postsecondary education was for everyone, not merely the privileged few. Miyoshi (1998) has pointed out how education was seen as a part of national culture, history, identity, and governance (p. 247). The strength of such an idea is its commitment to democratic engagement; the weakness of the idea pertained to the imposition of what the dominant defined as knowledge. As is self-evident at the beginning of the 21st century, the result of dominant definitions of what counted as knowledge was that people of color, women, the poor, and other social groups on the margins of society were often excluded from the curriculum. Indeed, the culture wars that have taken place over the last 20 years in large part have revolved around redefinitions of the country's culture. Whereas at one point, the definition of an educated citizen pertained to the classics of what came to be known as dead White males, today, the canon of what one needs to know is no longer certain.
The consequences of the debate over cultural diversity have only been furthered by globalization's practices. The power of the state to define what counts as knowledge has not only been reduced by questions from those groups who have been excluded. In addition, and perhaps more critically, the state's role in knowledge definition and generation has been reduced by the rise of globalization. Education has been stripped of its cultural mission. The state no longer has a role as a cultural arbiter and shaper of the public good, so public education has lost its purpose as well. The question thus turns on what its purpose might be in a global economy (Readings, 1996, p. 46) .
Beginning with Max Weber, there have been analyses about how dominant groups have created theoretical justifications for the fact that they were privileged. Bourdieu's analyses of "cultural capital" served as guideposts to many researchers in providing a critique of privilege. Cultural codes existed that enabled the powerful to maintain and increase their power. These cultural codes had to do with the symbolic texts and discourses the children of the wealthy brought to and learned in school. The power of these codes was reconceptualized by community groups and democratic change agents such as Hispanic-serving institutions, which led to an attack on the role education played in maintaining inequality. Although the reformations never fully succeeded in overcoming the power of the dominant, the changes were efforts aimed at reducing inequality.
Education's role today has become one where competence is at the core of its purpose. Whereas merit was once used as a method to ensure that those who were most discriminated against might have an equal educational opportunity, today's merit means something else. Merit now implies that education is to be focused on training; the manner in which one assesses whether a student should proceed is via testing. If one scores higher on a test, then one merits advantage over those who score lower-regardless of one's educational or social background. The symbolic message sent via a preoccupation with test measures, of course, is that those who do not succeed deserve to fail. Hence, globalization's purpose for education reinscribes a theoretical justification for the dominant to be dominant. The "global community" is a community of individuals where everyone starts a race and the individuals who finish first and last deserve what they get.
Cultural codes get redefined not by whether one has visited museums or has access to masterpieces of literature. Instead, cultural codes are equated with the competence one displays on standardized tests. Education, rather than being seen as a vehicle to move individuals out of the lower class, is a training agent for business and industry. Any sense that education ought to inculcate youth with a sense of how to participate in the democratic sphere falls by the wayside. A sense of cultural integrity or pride in the fact that one is Hispanic, for example, falls by the wayside. The goal becomes teaching to a test to ensure that one's charges are competent. Time, for the young as for the old, becomes a commodity. How one "spends" time becomes critically important in a globalized world. Rather than think of childhood as a time for play, growth, and enrichment, as Jonathon Kozol (2001) has encouraged us to do, childhood becomes the training ground for adulthood. When students have an "ill-spent" youth, they will not pass the necessary tests for success in adulthood. How one frames education so that it meets the needs of globalization returns us to a discussion of the public good.
Framing Education
If education is training, then numerous providers are capable of educating individuals. Although the research literature seems to have been consumed about whether charter schools in public education are a good or bad experiment, the growth that has occurred most rapidly in the educational sector has less to do with a modest experiment in public education than with the private sector. Education has become a hot commodity. Corporations now offer academies and universities. U.S. corporations spend more than $40 billion annually on training (Burbules & Torres, 2000, p. 8) . Merrill Lynch has put a book out about education as a growth industry. The fastest growing educational sector in the United States is that of for-profit providers who offer certification for particular skills. By and large, the certificates are not provided in high schools, adult education centers, or community colleges. Instead, private groups that are often attached to corporations will certify any individual who paid to take a particular course and passed the test.
When private companies offer training, and the purpose of education is training, then the role of public education is reduced, if not eliminated. When one looks across the industrialized and globalized world, the same patterns occur. Budget cuts occur at a public level and the privatization of services occurs at another. When extra monies are put into the system, the fiscal support goes toward testing. A commodification of knowledge takes place such that at an elementary level, what one learns on a test is all that is necessary. What one learns at a postsecondary level is an advanced set of skill sets for a digital world. The result is that the stratification of teaching and learning increases rather than decreases.
Of course, learning does not simply occur through assessment-based curricula. Individuals arrive to the course with all sorts of skills and competencies. The affluent come to courses with advanced preparation-not necessarily by what they learned in the classroom but by the opportunities provided to them by their economic backgrounds. Not only are they the ones least affected by the privatization of the public sector, but they are also most able to capitalize on testable skills and the manipulation of digital information.
The digital divide sorts individuals by their access to the Internet and all that it can provide. Castells (2001) succinctly stated what anyone who visits low-income, public schools will conclude: "The school system . . . is by all accounts woefully inadequate in the use of this new learning methodology" (p. 259). Public education finds itself in a vicious circle. Because schools are territorially defined, there is a significant difference in terms of technological sophistication and the kind of learning that takes place. What one will see in the future, then, is amplified social differences and fewer public dollars going toward public education. As frames shift from public to private, inequality increases as does the role of educators.
Educators as Managers
A direct result of the redefinition of education and a relocation of education from the public to private sphere is the expectations for teachers. A new managerialism pervades the system. The student needs to be self-managed; the teacher is a manager who provides techniques to pass a test; the curriculum is geared toward managed objectives. One sees the new managerialism in all educational sectors. In postsecondary institutions, a president or provost once used to be thought of as "first among equals." Such a belief has long since passed, and presidents and provosts are now seen as administrators. Schools pressure teachers to teach to a test, and if their students do not pass, then the teachers are held accountable.
Henry Giroux (1988 Giroux ( , 1997 used to write about educators as "transformative intellectuals." Such a person was someone who is the opposite of the educational manager, and many will suggest that those who helped found Hispanic-serving institutions fit that role. A teacher who subscribed to the notion of transformation tried to work within and outside of the classroom to enable students who had been silenced and marginalized to seize voice. The goal of social transformation, however, is one that is lost in a globalized world. Whereas critical pedagogues might have tried to question the curriculum and see how it might be expanded to include those who had been left on the margins, today, such a goal seems quaint, if not irrelevant, if one subscribes to the popular notion of globalization advanced here.
The point, of course, is not that testing in and of itself is evil or that classroom management techniques are wrong. Tests can help educators measure where one needs to improve. A structured classroom may be more likely to enable learning to take place. However, when education is reduced to a series of techniques aimed at test taking, the democratic and cultural aspects of education have been reduced, if not lost. And the result for Hispanic-serving institutions is that one of their crucial roles is lost, and fiscal support from the state will erode.
Conclusion
It has been argued here that globalization is fundamentally changing the way the United States defines the public good and, of consequence, Hispanic higher education. The author has not argued against globalization. One ought not to suggest that everyone should resist globalization any more than one should argue against the sun coming up every day (Friedman, 2000) or that the swallows will stay away from Capistrano. The rapid flow of goods and services across porous borders, in large part the result of technological revolutions, is here to stay.
Also there has been no claim made that the past was a Golden Age. Hispanic individuals have long been denied equal opportunity, so to look to the past fondly is inappropriate. The Internet, technology, and other advances have improved lives in certain ways. And yet, the dangers outlined here are not going to evaporate. Indicators over the last decade have pointed to greater inequality. Globalization involves critically important cultural, economic, and political dimensions that have significant implications for Hispanic-serving institutions and Hispanic students. Curiously, at a time when schools and postsecondary institutions could be most useful at explicating the problems and pitfalls that exist, they have been transformed into vehicles to exacerbate those very same problems and pitfalls. The increased commodification of education has consequences for how one defines the "good society." Those definitions ought to be worked out in the public sphere. But again, if there is no public sphere, then no such challenges to the definition can come forward.
Thus, the author offers no panacea to the problems outlined here. A critical theory of globalization must first acknowledge the ramifications of the changes that are taking place, and then it needs to promote practices of resistance and struggle that enable democratic changes to take place. What those changes are and how we might go about enacting them is left for another article. For now, however, the author attempted to outline the challenges ahead. For, as with Steinbeck's landscape, at first glance, everything seems imponderable and out of human control. And yet, after analysis, we might be able to come up with ways to challenge new spheres of inequity so that we are able to help youth not merely in dealing with how to function in poor schools, but on life's inequitable road that awaits them.
